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Stories at Work
By Robert Akerlof, Niko Matouschek, and Luis Rayo∗
Chiat/Day, the iconic ad agency behind
Apple’s “1984” and “Think Different” cam-
paigns, was driven by a rebel spirit. In their
view, the Madison Avenue establishment
were square suits who shut down creative
voices and pandered to clients. By contrast,
Chiat/Day with its surfer culture, loose
dress code, and Venice Beach headquarters
shaped like a giant pair of binoculars, took
pride in breaking the rules and preaching
rebellion. According to founder Jay Chiat:
“We’re the pirates, not the navy.”1
Stories, like the one told at Chiat/Day,
are commonplace. They are a crucial
force shaping employee behavior: they af-
fect knowledge and beliefs (e.g., Bénabou,
Falk and Tirole, 2018, Gibbons and Prusak,
2020), serve as “mental models” (e.g.,
Cremer, Garicano and Prat, 2007, Mul-
lainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer, 2008,
and Gibbons, LiCalzi and Warglien, 2018),
and directly influence preferences (e.g., Ak-
erlof and Kranton, 2005). Presumably for
this reason, organizations spend consider-
able resources constructing and disseminat-
ing stories to their workforces.
Organizations display a variety of stories.
The Mayo Clinic, for instance, emphasizes
teamwork and patient-first care. In the
words of William J. Mayo: “The best inter-
est of the patient is the only interest to be
considered...[Consequently, it] has become
necessary to develop medicine as a coop-
erative science.”2 Lincoln Electric, in con-
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1Tungate (2007), p. 113.
2Berry and Seltman (2008), p. 22.
trast, has a philosophy of rugged individu-
alism. According to James Lincoln, “Com-
petition will mean the disappearance of the
lazy and incompetent.”3 A different story
prevailed at Arthur Andersen, where ac-
countants prided themselves on being “an-
droids” who took a traditional approach
to business and scrupulously followed long-
established procedures. The firm’s ideals
were manifested in its logo: the sturdy ma-
hogany double doors of its Chicago head-
quarters.
Stories are shaped by a combination of
top-down and bottom-up forces. On the
top-down side, organizations disseminate
stories that are advantageous for recruit-
ing and motivating workers. For exam-
ple, the Mayo Clinic, recognizing the im-
portance of maintaining its culture, hires
mostly from its own medical school where
the training process is referred to as “Mayo-
izing.” Likewise, Arthur Andersen put
new recruits through centralized training
at “Andersen U.” On the bottom-up side,
employees are more favorably disposed to-
ward some stories than others. An em-
ployee’s particular disposition is partly a
matter of the prevailing cultural context.
For instance, workers in more collectivist
countries may be more willing to adopt
a team-based story. Employees also have
greater receptivity to stories that are iden-
tity enhancing (e.g., Guadalupe, Kinias and
Schloderer, 2020). Chiat/Day’s story, for
instance, complemented the identities of its
employees, many of whom did not fit easily
into the traditionalist culture of Madison
Avenue.
Here, our focus will be on top-down de-
sign and on a firm’s use of stories, in par-
ticular, to motivate workers. We build a
model where an organization must find a
way to motivate employees both to work
3Berg and Fast (1975), p. 4.
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hard and to work on the right thing, all the
while keeping its budget balanced. The or-
ganization gets to choose the story of its
employees and, in conjunction, their mone-
tary incentives. As in Becker and Murphy
(1993)’s model, we treat stories as a form
of advertising—in our case to employees—
that affects utility and influences decision-
making.4
Our model predicts that an organization
will adopt one of two designs. The first de-
sign, which we call a “purpose-driven” or-
ganization, pairs flat monetary incentives
with a story that emphasizes the impor-
tance of generating output (e.g., saving
lives, putting a person on the moon). The
second one, which we call an “incentive-
driven” organization, pairs steep monetary
incentives with a narrower story that em-
phasizes the importance of maintaining eth-
ical standards (e.g., maintaining quality,
helping peers). Which design is optimal
depends on the severity of multitasking
and the relative costs of conveying differ-
ent types of stories. In section III, we shall
illustrate the applicability of these results.5
Our model is a first attempt at showing
how an organization’s choice of story from
a rich set can be formally incorporated into
its design problem. In our view, stories are
key for understanding differences in organi-
zational practices and, even more crucially,
differences in firm productivity.
I. Baseline model
We begin with a simple baseline model
without stories. This model builds on
Holmstrom (1982)’s model of team produc-
tion and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)’s
model of multi-tasking. There is a team
of n ≥ 2 identical players. Player i =
4Our model differs from Becker and Murphy (1993)
in two key respects. First, we consider a richer set of
possible stories. Second, whereas Becker and Murphy
(1993) consider the problem of motivating consumers,
we consider a more complex problem of motivating em-
ployees in a multitasking environment.
5Our paper is related to Prendergast (2007) and
Besley and Ghatak (2005) where, through selection, a
firm chooses the intrinsic motivation of its workers. This
choice is akin to the choice of story in our model. What
distinguishes our approach is that stories come in a va-
riety of flavors.
1, ..., n chooses two actions ai, bi ≥ 0 at
cost c(ai + bi). All choices are simultane-
ous. These actions result in team output
y := f(a,b) and individual performance
measures φi := g (ai, bi; a−i,b−i), where
variables in bold represent vectors. Play-
ers have a symmetric impact on output
and on the performance measures of their
peers—and so, for instance, the first-best
actions are the same for all players.6 Let
∆φi := φi −
∑n
j=1 φj/n denote how well a
player performed relative to the team. Both
the team’s output and the players’ perfor-
mance measures are contractible, but their
actions are not. We assume that c, f, and
g are smooth functions with c strictly in-
creasing and strictly convex, and f strictly
increasing and concave. Moreover, we as-
sume that the relative performance measure
∆φi is concave in player i’s actions, satisfies
∂∆φi
∂ai
> 0, and is more responsive to ai than





One interpretation is that ai and bi are
two dimensions of effort devoted to a given
task, such as “quantity” and “quality.” An-
other interpretation is that ai is effort de-
voted to an individual task, φi measures the
player’s performance in this task, and bi is
effort devoted to helping other players per-






Player i’s total compensation is wi (y, φ) ,
with
∑
iwi (y, φ) = y for all y and φ, so
that the team’s budget is balanced. Player
i’s payoff is wi (y, φ) − c(ai + bi). For sim-
plicity we assume that wi (y, φ) is linear and
symmetric across players so that wi (y, φ) ≡
y/n + λ∆φi for some λ ≥ 0, where λ is a
constant that captures the strength of the
players’ monetary incentives.
The team’s problem is to choose λ and
prescribe actions so as to maximize joint
surplus f(a,b) −
∑
i c(ai + bi) subject to
the constraint that ai, bi maximizes player
i’s payoff given a−i,b−i. Let (a
∗,b∗) :=
arg maxa,b f(a,b) −
∑
i c(ai + bi) denote
6Rayo (2007) also allows for individual performance
measures in a team environment, but there is no help-
ing or multitasking; Itoh (1991) allows agents to help
one another, but these agents contract with a principal
rather than with each other.
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the first-best actions (which we assume
are unique and interior), and let y∗ :=






faces a non-trivial multi-tasking problem
and the first-best actions cannot be at-
tained. The reason is standard: because
output must be shared across players, the
team needs to rely, at least in part, on in-
dividual incentives λ; but since the perfor-
mance measure is biased toward ai, these
incentives inevitably cause a distortion.
II. Stories
We now bring stories into the picture. We
assume that the team chooses a story, com-
mon to all players, that serves as an addi-
tional source of incentives. This story will
allow the team to implement the first best.
Player i’s payoff is now wi + si − c(ai +
bi), where the new term si represents the
player’s story utility. We assume that si
depends upon the player’s actions and team
output and takes the following form:
si (ai, bi, y) = α (ai − a∗)+β(bi−b∗)+τ (y − y∗) .
The particular story chosen by the team is
represented by non-negative constants α, β,
and τ . A story with a positive α is one that
emphasizes the importance of the first ac-
tion (e.g., producing a high volume of out-
put); a story with a positive β emphasizes
the importance of the second action (e.g.,
producing high quality output, or helping
peers); and a story with a positive τ empha-
sizes the value of team output per se (e.g.,
taking pride in the company’s mission).
We have assumed that players compare
their actions as well as the team’s output
against the first-best levels. This assump-
tion serves two purposes. First, it allows
us to focus on the incentive effect of sto-
ries, rather than their impact on utility (in
equilibrium, story utility will be zero). Sec-
ond, it adds realism to the model as there
is considerable evidence that people engage
in comparisons (see Akerlof, 2017).
While the team gets to choose any story
it wishes, it must devote resources to con-
structing it and disseminating it to its mem-
bers. We assume, in particular, that the
cost of the story is α + β + T · τ for some
parameter T > 0; that is, the firm faces
constant returns to scale in the intensity of
the story, and for simplicity the marginal
costs of α and β are equal (and normalized
without loss to 1).7
We shall focus on a special but instruc-
tive problem: choose the cheapest possible
combination of monetary incentives λ and
story α, β, τ subject to the constraint that
this combination induces players to choose
the first best.8 Dropping the i subscripts
for αi, bi, and ∆φi, the team’s problem is:
min
λ,α,β,τ≥0
α+ β + T · τ(1)
s.t.
(1/n+ τ)MC∗ + λ
∂∆φ∗
∂a
+ α = MC∗,
(1/n+ τ)MC∗ + λ
∂∆φ∗
∂b
+ β = MC∗,


















. The objective is the cost of the
story and the two constraints are the play-
ers’ first-order conditions for ai and bi, re-
spectively, evaluated at the first best. The
left-hand side of each equation measures
the marginal benefit of a higher action, and
the right-hand side measures its marginal
cost. Because of our assumptions, these
conditions are sufficient for implementing
the first best.
We now proceed to solve the team’s prob-
lem. We refer to a solution as an optimal
design, and to the corresponding story as
an optimal story. In what follows, we focus
on environments that are “generic” in the
sense that the linear program defined by (1)
has a single solution.9 The only instances
where this in not the case are knife-edge.
7By assuming that α and β have equal marginal
costs, we avoid biasing the story in favor of one action
over the other.
8In practice the team may opt for a less expensive
story that does not implement the first best. We con-
jecture that so long as the desired actions remain close
to first best, the optimal story will remain close to the
one we derive here.
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LEMMA 1: Every optimal story has α =
0.
To see why this is true, begin with a story
that motivates the first action a, at least in
part, through a positive α. The same ac-
tion a can be obtained by raising monetary
incentives λ and lowering α. Because these
stronger monetary incentives have the po-
tential to aggravate the multitasking prob-
lem, β might need to be raised. Even so,
since the contractible performance measure
∆φ is more responsive to a than to b, α
would fall more than β would grow; hence,
overall story costs would fall.
LEMMA 2: Every optimal story has ei-
ther τ = 0 or β = 0.10
This result tells us that a story that re-
wards players for total output (τ > 0) sub-
stitutes for a story that rewards them, more
narrowly, for action b (β > 0). The reason
is that a τ -story spreads incentives evenly
across both actions, therefore reducing the
need for a β-story that deals with the play-
ers’ multitasking problem. Moreover, be-
cause the story technology has constant re-
turns, the team goes to an extreme where
only one of these stories is employed.
THEOREM 1: The optimal design takes





and λ = β = 0.
10To see why, suppose τ, β > 0. Because α = 0, we
must have τ < (n− 1) /n and λ > 0. Now choose a small










). Both constraints are






). Generically, this change is either strictly
positive or strictly negative, which is a contradiction.
11The proof of the theorem is as follows. When






< 1) means that λ = 0. As a result, we
must have τ = n−1
n
. In this case, the per-player cost of
the story is n−1
n




∂∆φ∗/∂a in order to motivate action a, and








) in order to
address multitasking. In this case, the per-player cost of








). The last part
of the theorem follows from comparing the two story
costs.
2. Incentive-driven organization:
λ, β > 0 and τ = 0.12
The first design is optimal if and
only if T, the marginal cost of an











the severity of multitasking.
This result tells us that the team will ei-
ther adopt an output-based story and re-
move all monetary incentives, or will in-
stead offer high-powered monetary incen-
tives (sufficient to induce a first-best level
of action a) together with a narrower story
that rewards action b (sufficient to address
multitasking). We interpret this narrower
story as an ethical standard concerned with
maintaining quality or helping peers. In
other words, monetary incentives and τ -
stories are substitutes, whereas monetary
incentives and β-stories are complements.
Intuitively, because a τ -story provides in-
centives for both actions, and these incen-
tives are perfectly balanced, there is no
need for any additional instrument. In con-
trast, monetary incentives can only achieve
the first best when used in tandem with a
narrower β-story that counteracts the mul-
titasking bias.
Observe that, other things equal, the
team will be purpose-driven when the cost
of telling an output-based story is suffi-
ciently low. Thus, firms that produce the
types of output that employees naturally
value will gravitate toward this design. The
team will also be purpose driven when
the multitasking problem is sufficiently pro-
nounced,13 for in this case monetary incen-
tives become unattractive.
III. Applications
Here we present some examples of firms
that are organized in a way broadly consis-
12Specifically, λ = n−1
n
MC∗










13This occurs when the first-best actions are suffi-
ciently costly (so that MC∗ is high), when the per-






is large), or some combination of the two.
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tent with our predictions.
The Mayo Clinic is an example of a
purpose-driven organization. Its story em-
phasizing teamwork and patient-first care
is a prime example of a τ story. The ease
of telling this story is reflected in the anec-
dote of a custodian who, when asked why
she was working so hard cleaning a hospi-
tal room, responded “I’m saving patients’
lives.”14 In line with the model’s predic-
tions, Mayo complements its τ story with
a flat compensation structure under which
physicians’ pay depends only on specialty
and tenure. This structure was designed
deliberately to encourage efficient referrals
and cooperation (see Berry and Seltman,
2008).
Another powerful τ story can be found in
the U.S. Marine Corps. Their story, built in
part through a grueling boot camp, empha-
sizes team spirit, equality, and willingness
to sacrifice oneself for the cause, as encap-
sulated in their maxim: “Every Marine is
a rifleman.” Using this story is not with-
out costs. Recently, the Corps has faced
difficulties filling positions in critical high-
tech areas such as cyber security. They
have considered offering “lateral entry” to
civilians with the necessary expertise, start-
ing them at mid-career rank and exempt-
ing them from boot camp. The marines
are concerned, though, that such lateral
hires will make it harder to maintain their
story (in terms of our model, a higher cost
T ). Consequently, there is reticence about
the practice. As retired Lt. Col. Dakota
Wood points out, “If you go away from [the
maxim], then I think you lose something
that has made the Marine Corps what it
is...If that breaks down, you’ve got prob-
lems.”15,16
These examples contrast with profes-
sional service firms such as McKinsey,
Goldman Sachs, and Capital Group. In
14Ellis (2013), p. 31.
15See Schogol (2017).
16An example of a for-profit firm with a purpose-
driven organization is the international executive search
firm Egon Zehnder. Like Mayo, its story emphasizes
serving clients through teamwork and its pay structure
is flat. Partners share profits equally to encourage in-
formation sharing and referrals of clients to whoever is
in the best position to help them (See Zehnder, 2001).
line with the incentive-driven organiza-
tions predicted by our model, these firms
combine high-powered monetary incentives
with narrower stories extolling the virtue of
“professionalism,” the willingness to forgo
short-term profits for clients’ long-term
needs, a form of β story. Capital Group,
for instance, prides itself on going against
the industry norm of “selling what sells,”
Goldman Sachs impresses on its employees
that it would rather be “best than biggest,”
and McKinsey tells the story of how, at
age 93, its iconic former managing direc-
tor Marvin Bower interrupted a firm-wide
meeting to remind partners that “If there
is the shadow of a doubt on something be-
ing good for business but not truly pro-
fessional, do not do it!” (see Ellis, 2013,
pp. 4-16). Recent corporate scandals il-
lustrate the dangers such firms are exposed
to if their stories are not sufficiently com-
pelling to induce employees to resist their
monetary temptations.
Finally, to keep things simple, we have
assumed that all players are identical and
that they all share the same story. In prac-
tice, however, a firm might choose differ-
ent stories for different parts of its work-
force. Our model offers some hints as to
how this might play out. Consider, for ex-
ample, a team of homogeneous high-level
employees (such as managers) who perform
a broad set of tasks and thus face signif-
icant multitasking; separately, consider a
team of homogeneous low-level employees
(such as line workers) who perform more
focused tasks where multitasking is mini-
mal. Per Theorem 1, we expect the organi-
zation to spend significant resources in con-
structing a story for high-level employees
(based on either τ or β), but not for low-
level ones. Thus, the nature of the two jobs
will be very different: high-level employees
will experience, through their story, a sense
of meaning in their work; whereas low-
level employees will be rewarded primarily
through monetary incentives (for example,
through piece rate or efficiency wages) and
will potentially, and unfortunately, find less
meaning in their jobs. Concerning the role
of work in peoples’ lives, Derek Thomp-
son (2019) notes: “for the poor and mid-
6 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MONTH YEAR
dle class, work [is] a necessity; but for the
college-educated elite, it [has become] a
kind of religion, promising identity, tran-
scendence, and community.”
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